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"If economists could manage to get themselves
thouiht of as humble, competent people, on a
level with dentists, that would be splendid!n
J. H. Keynes

I

In dealing with questions of macroeconom ic policy, there is a fairly

well developed theory whose central theorem can be summarized as saying
that in a world of perfect certainty one needs at least as many instruments
of policy as independent policy objectives if all objectives are to be
achieved; when the number of macro objectives exceeds the number of instruments ,
one deals with the evaluation of trade-offs among objectives.

In general

equilibrium theory one objective-- such as maximizing consumers' utility
or achieving a Pareto optimtll:1 ("efficient" ) production mix--is postulated, and
then one derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for an "efficient"
~~
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situation.

Huch analytical work then concentrates on the impact of one market

imperfection, such as a uniform tariff on imports, the existence of one
monopolist among a group of competitive

industries, or the existence of a

single technological external economy or diseconomy in a society.

For example,

Johnson and Mieszkowski recently analyzed the impact of labor unions in the
United States under the assumptions that all other factor markets are perfectly
1
competitive and that final product markets are competitive.
The analysis changes when we are dealing with an economy that has more
than one market imperfection.

The General Theorem of the Second Best

states "• •• in a situation in which there exist many constraints which prevent
the fulfillment of the Paretian optimum conditions, the removal of any one
constraint may affect ~-rnlfare or efficiency either by raising it, by lowering
it 1 or by leaving it unchanged."

2

This theorem does not prevent some professional economists from offering
what they claim is "objective" ad~ice on partial economic re£e?m.
advice frequently appears to be of the following sort:

Such

(1) scan the real

world until one observes something that diverges from one of the theoretically
derived £'luilibrium conditions for an "efficient" economy, (2) recommend that
this discrepancy be entirely eliminated by a set of new policies, and
(3) occasionally note that the government should make "lump-sum" transfers
1 Harry G. Johnson and Peter Hieszkowski, "The Effedts of Unionization
on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach,~ Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 84 (Uovember 1970), pp. 539-561~
2&. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best,"
Review of Econonic Studies, Vol. 24 (1956-57), p. 12.

;
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of income to those hurt by the reform.

Government officials tend to move

more slowly than their advisors wish, perhaps because of a feeling that the
future environment is highly uncertain, that present actioµs tend to have
unforeseen consequences, that social experiments are f~equently irreversible,
and lump sum transfers of income will not be made,
The impact of market imperfections may also be mitigated by macroeconomic
policy.

For example, Brimmer finds that the inflationary period in the U.S.

from 1965-1968 was accompanied by an increase from 55 percent to 63 percent
in the ratio of median non-white family income to median white family income.
The "distortion of inflation"--in Brimrner's words--apparen tly partially
offset the impact of (past end present) racial discrimination in the labor market.
The proclivity of economists confidently to offer policy advice after
studying only one part of a real economy may stem from an intuitive belief
that in most cases reducing the number of imperfections in the economy
is unlikely to reduce total output; we know of no'analysis that suggests
even a vague probability of such an occurence.

One major area where theoretical

analysis has demonstrated a Second Best case is in tariff policy, where world
output may fall when tariffs by some countries are eliminated while tariffs
against other countries are maintained (i.eo, more trade diversion than trade
creation may result from the creation of a customs unior1) •.
This paper uses a simple theoretical model to generate a numerical
example where the elimination qf an imperfection in one input market-1

Andrew F" Brimmer, "Inflation and Income Distribution in the United
States," Review of Economics and Statistics, 53 (February 1971), PI>• 37-48.

1
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when the impe rfect ion in
say labo r--le ads to a lower level of real outpu t
the secon d inpu t mark et--sa y capi tal-- is main taine d~

Follo wing the prese ntati on

wing secti on solve s the
of the gene ral model in the next secti on, the follo
in turn are the basis for some
model for some spec ific numb erica l exam ples, which
gene ral conc lusio ns in the last secti on~

II

Johns on,
Follo wing the prece dents of Fishl ow and David and of

1

who

ider two outp uts-analy zed some of the probl ems in this area, we cons
1A. Fishl ow and P. Davi d, "Opti mal Reso urce Alloc ation in an Impe rfect
(December 1961 ), pp.
Market Setti ng," Journ al of Poli tical Economy, 69
s and the Shape
529-5 46. Harry G. Johns on, "Fac tor Mark et Disto rtion
1966 ), pp. 686-6 98.
of the Tran sform ation Curv e," Econ omet rica, 34 (July
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agricul ture (A) and manufac turing (11/--an d two inputs labor (L) and
capital (K),

2

and we ignore any dynamic effects- -such as the effect of dis-

tortions on savings .

He assume each output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas

producti on function .

Let Q.J. be the quantity of the ith good produced and

Li and Ki be the amounts of labor and capital allocate d to the producti on
of the ith commodi ty.
a¾_l-aA

(II - 1)

QA = 1 A A

(II - 2)

QH = L.,,r
..L'l

al~-aH
r

1'1

where O < aA < 1
where O <

a

n

<

1

The total supplies of labor (L) and of capital (K) in the economy
are held constan t:
(II

3)

(II - 4)

ICA + 1):I

=

K

We wish to maximiz e the value of the combined output of agricult ure
and manufac turing (Y), with the prices (PA and PU) being fixed~
(II - 5)

1 The labels of output are obvious ly unimpor tant. One might identify
the two sectors as large firms and small firms, unionize d firms and non
unionize d firms, or domestic firms and firms m-med by foreigne rs.
2

For those who dislike talking about short-ru n shifts in the allocati on
of a stock of capital and a price of capital , the second input could be
consider ed as imported rau materia ls, whose value is fixed by the net flow
of foreign capital into the country; as will be discusse d later on, we assume
the value of exports of final goods equals the value of imports of final goods~
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This procedure allows us to avoid specifying a utility functi-01)~
Fishlow and David did), and we rationalize it in one of two ways:

(i) governments frequently announce an objective of achieving a ,c,ertain

level of real output over the next few years in "constant prices," which in
practice either are the prices observed in some base period (the actual
working of the economy) or are prices set by the government's planners

{representing the planners' utility function) or
(ii) international trade theory shows how a society maximizes its
"utility" by producing at the point on its transformation curve that
maximizes its output valued at world prices and then trading at world
prices to reach its highest "indifference curve"; for a "small" country world
prices can be taken as exogenous.

We introduce market distortions into our soGiety by stipulating that for
a particular input its price in one sector is some constant (Di) times its
price in the other sector:

1

(II - 6)

PKM = DKPKA

where DK > 0

(II - 7)

PLH = DLPLA

where DL > O

Market distortions (D
as:

1

#

1 and/or DK# 1) may occur for reasons such

(i) governments (or other groups) adopt policies--such as minimum wage

legislation or differential taxes on capital-which differentially affect
prices in the two sectors or (ii) inputs are allocated to firms by means
other than market prices, such as licensing of capital or imports.
1 Johnson introduces a single distortion by stipulating that
Pl<l/PLM # PKA/PLA• Johnson, op. cit.

We assume--
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based on the characte ristics of some developin g countrie s-that the manufactu d.ng.
sector faces a lower price for capital and a higher price for labor than
1
We further assume that producers in each
does the agricultu ral sector.
sector maximize profits, which implies that the capital labor ratio is higher
in manufactu ring and lower in agricuttu re than it would be in the presence
of perfect factor markets.

We assume the economy is in equilibriu m when

profits are zero in both sectors.

We also assume that in equilibriu m there

is a positive marginal productiv ity of both labor and capital in both
manufactu ring and agricultu re (i.e., there is no corner solution) .

Some

readers may feel this last assumptio n makes our analysis inapplica ble to
developin g countries with "surplus labor."

Rather than attempt to survey

the extensive literatur e on "labor surplus economies ," we simply note while
this model does not describe such economies , the problems of partial economic
reforms can occur also in these economies .

1

Not all cconooist s would consider this a realistic assumptio n~
Iida says that in Japan every factor earns more in the "modern" sector
than it does in the "backward " sector. Tsuneo Iida, "A Non-Neoc lassical
Analysis of Resource Allocatio n in the Dual Economy," Economic Journal.
75 {September 1965), p. 557.
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III

To get numeric al solution s, we assume that firms maximize profits and
face output prices of PA= P11 = 1 and that the technolo gical coeffic ients
of the econo~y are now specifie d as follows:
(III - 1)

QA = L.8K.2
A A

(III - 2)

QH = L11.41)6
1

(III - 3)

LA+

(III - 4)

KA+ 1)1 = 100

(III - 5)

y:::: QA+ QB

(III - 6)

PK11 =

(III - 7)

PLH = l.22PLA

½,t

1

= 100

.SPKA

These factor market distorti ons are plausib le for develop ing countri es.
William son estimate s that within manufac turing in the Phillipi nes in 1966,
wages in one SIC sector were as low as 59 percent of wages in another SIC

sector, capital costs were as low as 51 percent of capital costs in another
sector, and the ratio of capital costs to labor costs in one sector was as
2
low as 45 percent of another sector's ratio.
1we note that we did not have to experim ent with differen t sets
of coeffic ients to obtain our results; this was the first set we tried.
2

Jeffrey G. William son, "Capita l Accumu lation, Labor Saving, and
Labor Absorpt ion Once Hore," Quarterl y Journal of Economics, 85 (February 1971),
P• 52.
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In this situation, real output is 106.860.

With a perfect labor market

(PLM = PLA) and a distorted capital market (PKH = .5PKA)' output is 105.835.
output with two distortions is, with these par:"1:'.:'.e.t:3rs, grP.!lter than output with

one distortion.

Output with no distortions is 109.023.

Thus the assumed

discrepanci es of 50 percent in the capital market and 22 percent in the labor
market reduce output by only 2 percent.

1

This result occurs even when the two distortions are, as in this

P.xample, not in the same direction.

One might expect that reducing the

discrepancy in the ratio of the relative factor prices in the two sectors
from .41 (.41

~

.5/1.22) to .5 (.5 = .5/1) would increase income, but in fact

it lowers the income that would be produced under our assumed behavioral

rules.
What is the economic explanation for these results?

Since initially

each sector was earning zero profits, at the initial levels of output agriculture
will incur losses and manufacturi ng will show positive profits upon the elimina•
tion of the wage di.s.tortion, as the initial effect will be to lower labor
costs in manufacturi ng and to raise labor costs in agriculture•..So ..output
of manufacturi ng will expand and output of agriculture will decline until
each sector again earns zero profits.

As

labor and capital shift from agriculture

to manufacturi ng, the prices of labor and of capital will be different
2 Because agriculture
in the new equilibrium positi·on than in the initi.al one.
1The size of this reduction is consistent with the conclusions of
Johnson, op. cit., and is dependent on the technologic al specificatio n of the model.
2

In our computer program, we do not actually trace the transition from
one equilibrium to another. Rather, we derive the transformat ion curve with
one distortion and then scan it until we find the point where the equilibrium
conditions are satisfied. This output point is then compared to the point
on the two-distort ion transformat ion curve ~here the equilibrium conditions
are satisfied.
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is more labor intensive than manufacturi ng, the new uniform wage rate is
lower than the old separate w;1ge rates in both agriculture and manufacturi ng,
and the new separate interest rates are higher in both sectors than the old
separate inter est rates.
Since the various transformat ion curves are so close together, we show
in Figure I only the transformat ion curve representin g a distorted capital
market and a perfect labor market; this transformat ion curve is, of course,
inside the (undrawn) transformat ion curve where both factor markets are perfect.
Point 2A is the equilibrium point on the transformat ion curve (also not
drawn) representin g distortions in both factor markets.

Point lB--on the

transformat ion curve with one distortion- -is superior to point 2A in the sense
that a larger quantity of manufacture s and the same quantity of agriculture
is produced at lB than at 2A.

Point lA gives a larger output (at the assumed

world prices) than either points lB or lC.

Yet with one dist©rtion society

produces at point 1c~-1here profits are approximate ly zero--rathe r than at
either lB or lA because at lB and lA large profits are earned in manufacturi ng.
It should be noted that in the presence of distortions the world price ratio
pp in diagram l--is not tangent to the transformat ion curve at the point
where profit maximjzing firms produce.

l

Profits are as shown below:

1 E. Hagen, "An Economic Justificatio n of Protectionis m," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 72 (November 1958), pp. 507-508. Hagen considers
pne distortion, but his proof is easily extended to two distortions .

DP135-11

QM, Manufacturing
Output

Agricultural
Output

Figure~
Distorted Capital Market Transformation Curve and Output Points
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Table 1

OUTPUT
Agricu lture Hanufa cturing

Point

PROFITS
Agricu lture Hanufa cturing

Total Output
in
Fixed Prices

.ooo

109.02 3

0

11.615

107.834

63,382

0

8.012

107.494

28.377

77.458

0

0

105.835

44.112

62.748

0

0

106.860

A

56.211

52.811

lA

56.211

51.623

lB

44.112

lC
2A

.ooo

This example simply reaffir ms the obviou s propos ition that the results
on
of economic policy depend on how produc ers respond to prices as well as
"techn ical" parame ters.

In the presenc e of distort ions, real output could

be greate r if firms did not maximize profit s.
Suppos e that for politic al reasons the distort ion in the capita l market
cannot be elimin ated.

We have already shown that elimin ating the distort ion

in the labor market will reduce output .

To maximize output , one could reduce

output
the distort ion in the labor market and also introdu ce a distort ion in the
market .

The output distort ion takes the form of a tax on one commodity (or a

subsidy on the other) so that the ratio of domest ic output prices no longer
equals the ratio of world output prices .

In our exampl e, a capita l market

.5,
distor tion coeffic ient of .5, a labor market distort ion coeffic ient of
produc e
and a ratio of domest ic output prices of .5 will lead the economy to
tions.
the same output- -val11e d at world prices --as it would produce with no distor

The input price distort ions are set so as to move the economy to the

•

-13-

transfor mation curve represen ting no input distorti ons, and the output
distorti on moves the-,..economy along this curve to the point (A in figure I)
that maximiz es the value (in world prices) of output produced .

Thus three

distorti ons are equivale nt to no distorti ons.
IV
Suppose a decision maker wants his economy eventua lly to be free of
distorti ons,

He may then view impleme nting a set of micro policy reforms

as an investm ent decision .

He may agree with his technica l advisor on the

implica tions of a proposed set of policies and still refuse to implement it
because the rate of return is less than his social rate of time discoun t.
For example, suppose that the economy is initiall y as describe d. in Section s
II and III, at the beginnin g of the first year the distorti on ill the labor
market will be elimina ted, and at the beginnin g of the third year the distorti on
in the capital market will also be ,:emoved.

So output in world prices will

be as follows:

-

Policy Package

Year

Status Quo

1

106.86

105.84

2

106.86

105.84

3

106.86

109.02

4

106.86

109,02

The rate of return on this policy package is 3.9 percent over a three year
time horizon .and about 45 percent over a four year time horizon ,
In his per¢ept ive analysis of decision -making , Lindblom says ",.,a wise
policy-m akel' consequ ently expects that his policies will achieve only part

of what he hopes and at the same ti~e will produce un~nticipat ed consequence s
he would have preferred to avoid ••• His decisior.. is only one step, one that

if s.uccessful can quickly be followed by anothero ••

111

If the indices by

which "success" is measured are subject to "second-bes t" prcblems, then
a decisiou<-ma ker may need the coa:i:ege to pur:::1_,_.~ a particular strategy in
apparent disregard of the

11

fa.cts,"

Suppos~ the u!lderlying structure of the

economy described above was unknown.) but it was observed by everyone that
factor prices were unequ2.l in the two sectc,rsc
to have enough data to compute o,_,tput

<-1.t

The decision-ma ker is assumed

world prir.es and has secured agreement

that changes in output are the measure of the success of his program.

2

Slowly eliminating the distortion in the labor market will slowly reduce
~,tput below the status quo level.

Citizens, ignorant of the economy's

could interpret this result as a refutation of the micro-econo mic
si~ucture,
-.... .-.
:::.

th~ry they have learned.

The decision-ma ker, .s.lso ignorant of the econ~•~

structure, will be unable to "prove"--vi a changes in the measure of success••
that his policies are correct until he has eliminated both the labor market
distortion and the capital market distortion.

Even if everyone has the same

discount rate and uses the same index of success~ "incrementa l decision-ma king"
may be very controversi al unless ev,;,ryone is prcpar.:!d to suspend judgment on

a new program until the results of th-:? entj :re set of new polj_cies ,,1;,e..,J.mown.

1 ch

Thrcug h' , " Publi
• •
· e._,
" ir.·..
nud·,111.ng
,.nc•::~ o f ,...,_
.1...e .-,c
ar 1 es E ,, L.1.ndbl om, """b
Administrat ion Revie~, 19 (Sp:::irsg 1959) ~ p,, £6,
2

Lindblom arg._,..~r: that consen,;;us frequcr.tly c.s.n be reached only on
policies and not on objectiv,c:r:; but. pr::sumc'!Jly one needs agreement on indices
of success in order to evaluF..tf?. polj_d.es.,

